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Computational Complexity of Continuous Variable
Quantum Key Distribution
Yi-Bo Zhao, You-Zhen Gui, Jin-Jian Chen, Zheng-Fu Han and Guang-Can Guo
Abstract— The continuous variable quantum key distribution
has been considered to have the potential to provide high secret
key rate. However, in present experimental demonstrations, the
secret key can be distilled only under very small loss rates. Here,
by calculating explicitly the computational complexity with the
channel transmission, we show that under high loss rate it is hard
to distill the secret key in present continuous variable scheme and
one of its advantages, the potential of providing high secret key
rate, may therefore be limited.
Index Terms— Computational complexity, Continuous vari-
able, Error correction, Quantum key distribution, Reconciliation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to its potential for achieving high modulation and
detection speed, continuous variable (CV) quantum key distri-
bution (QKD) has recently attracted more and more attention.
Compared to single photon counting schemes, CVQKD does
not require single photon sources and detectors which are
technically challenging now. The CVQKD schemes typically
use the quadrature amplitude of light beams as information
carrier, and homodyne detection rather than photon counting.
Some of these schemes use non-classical states, such as
squeezed states [1] or entangled states [2], while others use
coherent states [3], [4], [5], [6]. Because the squeezed states
and entangled states are sensitive to losses in the quantum
channel, coherent states are much more attractive for long
distance transmission. To improve the performance of the
CVQKD against the channel loss, Grosshans et al proposed
a reverse reconciliation (RR) protocol [11]. In the traditional
direct reconciliation protocol, Alice sends Bob the quantum
state and also sends the reconciliation information later1.
Finally, Bob obtains Alice’s data without any error. However,
in the reverse reconciliation protocol, the quantum state is sent
by Alice to Bob, but the reconciliation information is sent by
Bob to Alice. Finally, Alice gets Bob’s received data with no
error.
Table-top experimental setups that encode information in the
phase and amplitude of coherent states has been demonstrated
This work was supported in part by the National Fundamental Research
Program of China under Grant No 2006CB921900, National Natural Science
Foundation of China under Grants No. 60537020 and 60621064, Innovation
Fund of the University of Science and Technology of China under Grants No.
KD2006005 and the Knowledge Innovation Project of the Chinese Academy
of Sciences (CAS)
All the authors are with the Key Lab of Quantum Information, University
of Science and Technology of China, (CAS), Hefei, Anhui 230026, China
(e-mail: zfhan@ustc.edu.cn).
1In the following we use the conventional appellation. Alice is the quantum
state sender and Bob is the quantum state receiver.
[7], [8], and recent experiments have shown the feasibility of
CVQKD in optical fibers up to a distance of 55km [9], [10],
but without obtaining the final secret keys.
Unlike the single photon QKD schemes, many CVQKD
schemes utilize the inertial quantum noise to protect infor-
mation from Eve’s attack [7], [12]. However, at the same time
the quantum noise also causes errors between two legitimate
communicators, Alice and Bob. It is widely believed that
through the classical error correction the errors between Alice
and Bob can be corrected and partial information can still
be kept in secret. Nevertheless, in the QKD we should not
only guarantee that the errors between Alice and Bob can
be corrected, but also ensure that Eve cannot know all the
information of the secret keys after the error correction. In
the following we will see that such requests actually pose
a challenge to the error correction. After showing that the
lower bound of the block size of the required error correction
for the QKD is inversely proportional to the square of the
secret information carried by per element, we illustrate that
the reconciliation is a big hindrance to the CVQKD.
In principle, if the mutual information between Alice and
Bob is larger than that between Eve and Bob, Alice and
Bob can establish unconditional secure secret keys by the
RRCVQKD protocol [17], [18], [19]. However, in practice
we should also consider the feasibility. Before establishing
the secret keys, the errors contained in Alice and Bob’s
variables should be corrected. Then certain amount of error
correction information2 should be publicly exchanged [12],
[22], [23]. At the same time, while received this public
error correction information, Eve can get more information
about Alice and Bob. To guarantee the security we should
ensure that Eve cannot totally know Alice and Bob’s key.
Then the amount of publicly exchanged information should be
below certain threshold. Suppose before the error correction
the mutual information rate per key element between Alice
and Bob is IAB and that between Eve and Bob is IEB ,
after the error correction the mutual information rate per key
element between Alice and Bob is I ′AB , and the amount of
the published effective3 error correction information rate per
key element is R. Here we can see that before the error
correction the theoretical amount of secret key rate they can
generate is ∆I = IAB − IBE -bit. After the error correction
the mutual information rate per key element between Alice
2The error correction information is actually the check bit of the redundant
coding. In the QKD, the check bit can be separately sent.
3There may be much auxiliary information exchanged, which however does
not bring any useful information about the key to Eve. Here the effective
means the information that may leak Eve useful knowledge about the key.
2and Bob becomes I ′AB ≤ IAB + R and that between Eve
and Bob becomes IBE +R. Then if Alice corrects her errors
and finally shares Bob’s bits the secret key rate after the error
correction becomes ∆I − (R − I ′AB + IAB). Here we can
see that to generate pure secret keys finally, it should be
guaranteed that R−(I ′AB−IAB) < ∆I . Set I ′AB−IAB = R′.
Therefore, in practice we should use less than R′ + ∆I-bit
information for per key element to correct errors that can
only be corrected with more than R′-bit information for per
key element. While the ∆I/IAB exponentially decreases with
the increase of the transmission distance, the practical error
correction should exponentially approach the Shannon limit.
In some literature, they defined a reconciliation efficiency eff
to evaluate the reconciliation [7], [11], [12]. Here 1 − eff
actually correspond to (R −R′)/IAB . Also, in Ref. [13], M.
Heid et al have evaluated the influence of the reconciliation
efficiency to the binary modulated CVQKD. From their result,
it can be seen that if the reconciliation efficiency is not 1, the
maximum achievable distance of the CVQKD will be reduced.
In the following we will show the relationship between the
achievable distance and the computational complexity.
II. DIFFICULTY WITH REVERSE RECONCILIATION
CVQKD: AN EXAMPLE
Here, we consider a specific example of Gaussian-
modulated RRCVQKD [7]. In the reverse reconciliation pro-
tocol, the quantum state is sent by Alice to Bob but the
reconciliation information is sent by Bob to Alice. Finally
the secret key rate is given by the difference between the
mutual information rate between Alice and Bob and that
between Eve and Bob. After the quantum communication,
some CVQKD schemes directly provide the binary keys [3],
while the Gaussian-modulated CVQKD scheme only provide
the continuously distributed key elements [7] that should be
converted into common binary bits. Here we only discuss
the latter one. It has been proposed that this conversion can
be achieved by reconciliation. Nevertheless, how to realize
proper reconciliation is still an open problem. One existing
reconciliation protocol was suggested by G. Van Assche et al
[12], in which they subtly combined the quantization with the
sliced error correction. They quantize the continuous-variable
into binary keys at first and then do the error correction
to those keys. Different from single photon schemes, in the
Gaussian-modulated RRCVQKD one, most of the transmitted
information can be known by Eve and only a very small
portion can be kept in secret. The signal to noise ratio (SNR)
between Alice and Bob is only slightly higher than that
between Eve and Bob, and the difference of the two may be
overwhelmed by the fluctuation of noise. Then, the distilling
the secret key will amount to looking for a needle in a
haystack. For example, let us take the line loss to be 20dB
(100km fiber with an attenuation coefficient of 0.2dB/km),
under which the maximum secret information per key element
carries is about 0.007-bit [7] (i.e., on average, 1-bit secret key
requires 1/0.007=143 key elements). Suppose the variance of
Bob’s measurement is 2N0, under which Alice’s modulation
variance is 100N0, where N0 denotes the variance of the
vacuum noise. Then the mutual information between Alice and
Bob is 0.5-bit and that between Eve and Bob is 0.493-bit. On
estimating Bob’s results, the difference between Alice’s and
Eve’s noise is about 0.01N0, which can be calculated from
Ref. [7]. To distill the secret key, at first those associated
key elements should be converted into binary keys. The
quantization will certainly induce information loss, although
the loss can be exponentially reduced. To ensure the lost
information to be less than 0.007-bit per key element, the
reconciliation should be precise enough to distinguish the
slight noise change of 0.01N0, so each key element should be
converted into at least 0.5 log2(2N0/0.01N0) ≈ 4 independent
binary digits. After the conversion, Alice and Bob at least
get 4 binary digits from one key element and the secret
information contained by them will be certainly less than
0.007-bit. Since the information per element carry is 0.5-bit,
to correct bit-errors, at least 3.5-bit additional information
should be exchanged for one key element. Then, on average,
143×4=572 binary digits contribute to less than one secret key
and at the same time 143×3.5≈500-bit additional information
should be exchanged. Therefore, the distillation is equivalent
to extracting a secret bit at least in 1072 binary digits, which
is quite impractical as the error fluctuations in 572 digits
may easily overwhelm the 1-bit secret key information to be
distilled.
To distill the secret key, errors in quantized bits should
be corrected. In theory, the errors in 572 bits require at
least 500-bit additional information to correct, but the secret
information carried by 572 bits is less than 1-bit and Eve can
use less than 501-bit additional information to know all of
Bob’s information, which means that if 501-bit error correction
information is exposed there may be no secret information
kept from Eve, so to correct the errors in 572 bits and to
ensure corrected bits still carry secret information, the publicly
exposed reconciliation information should not exceed 501-
bit. Then the practical error correction should use less than
501/500=1+0.2% times the theoretical minimum information
to correct the errors at a high bit error rate (BER). While in
Ref. [22], [23], even at a BER as small as 3%, this ratio can be
enhanced to 120%, much higher than 1+0.2%, but still pose a
technical challenge. In fact, to improve the practical channel
information capacity is a hot topic in classical communications
[20]. One major goal is to correct the errors with as little
redundant information as possible. Up to now, even under ideal
situations (e.g., in the standard channel, at fixed coding rate,
under the optimized SNR and distinguishing the BER of each
bit), present state-of-the-art error correction schemes, such
as Low-Density Parity-Check (LDPC) [20] and Turbo [21]
codes, may in theory only get information with low BER from
1.001 times (0.0045dB) of the theoretical minimum resource
[20]. While in practice, this theoretical performance is still
hard to reach at present. In the above example, Alice should
get information from less than 572+501=1073 binary digits
without any error, while in theory this information should be
obtained from at least 1072 binary digits. The ratio of them
is 1073/1072=1.0009 or 0.0040dB, smaller than 0.0045dB,
which is a huge challenge to the error correction technique.
In practice, the required performance of error correction will
3be much higher. To our knowledge there is no such error
correction that can meet its requirement.
In Refs. [7], [12], they sorted those uncorrelated bits ap-
proximately with the same BER into one group and correct
errors respectively. It is possible that BERs of some groups are
smaller than the average one, so their errors are more easily to
correct than the above analysis. However, there are certainly
some groups the BER of which are higher than the average
one and require much more complex error correction. Then
on average its required error correction may be more difficult
to realize than the above analysis. Actually, in Ref. [7] they
directly exposed these bits with a high BER, whereas whether
such operation affects the security requires further discussion.
In the above, we have discussed a limit case, under which
the quantization can be ideal and the correlation as well as the
asymmetry can be neglected. In fact, such limit case cannot
be reached and each of the converted digit may be correlated
with each other and the channel may be binary asymmetric, so
one continuous-element should be converted into many more
digits. Also, the correlation and the asymmetry will greatly
increase the complexity and reduce the efficiency of the error
correction. Therefore, in practice, things will be much more
difficult than what we have shown in the above example.
III. COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY OF THE REQUIRED
ERROR CORRECTION
A. Simple model
In the following, we will calculate explicitly the compu-
tational complexity of the error correction including secret
key information carried by single digit. Here we will start
from a binary symmetric model, and then extend it to more
general case. Later we will show that such model can be
applied to current CVQKD scheme. Suppose after many com-
munications and processes, Alice and Bob get binary strings
MA = (MA1, . . . ,MAm)
T and MB = (MB1, . . . ,MBm)T of
length m, respectively. In the following, it is assumed that the
channel is binary symmetric, i.e., the binary strings contain
equal probabilities of 0’s and 1’s, the bits in the strings are
uncorrelated. Also, it is assumed that the error correction
information is sent by Bob to Alice and with this error
correction information Alice can correct all of the errors only
when the number of errors is below a threshold value [14]. We
define eAB = Pr(MAi 6= MBi) as the BER and S(MB|E)
as the entropy rate per bit of Bob’s string conditioned on
Eve’s state. Then the maximum amount of secret key that can
be distilled by Alice and Bob is m[S(MB|E) − H(eAB)]-
bit, where H(x) = −x log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) is the
Shannon entropy. To share the common secret key, Alice and
Bob should eliminate the errors in their final binary string.
Then, they can use, for example, error correction, to tolerate
certain amount of errors. Suppose Alice can correct at most
merec errors with Bob’s error correction information, where
erec is an introduced parameter. Then mH(erec)-bit additional
information is required and after the error correction, the
maximum amount of secret keys becomes m[S(MB|E) −
H(erec)]-bit. While the average amount of errors between
Alice and Bob is meAB , the actual amount of errors will
fluctuate, and the fluctuation obey the binomial distribution
with variance meAB(1−eAB) 4. Here, we introduce parameter
λ and suppose the number of practical errors is mλ. Then the
binomial distribution of errors between Alice and Bob can be
approximated by a Gaussian:
P (λ) ≈ m√
2pimeAB(1− eAB)
× exp[− (meAB −mλ)
2
2meAB(1 − eAB) ] (1)
Only when λ ≤ erec can the errors be corrected, so the
probability that Alice correct her errors is
β =
∫ erec
0
P (λ)dλ ≈
∫ erec
−∞
m√
2pimeAB(1− eAB)
× exp[− (meAB −mλ)
2
2meAB(1 − eAB) ]dλ (2)
To share common secret key with high probability, Alice
and Bob should guarantee that β → 1. To distill the secret
key, they should maintain S(MB|E) > H(erec). Then it
requires m to be sufficiently large. For given probability β,
error correction criteria erec and BER eAB , the length m can
be given by:
m =
eAB(1− eAB)
(erec − eAB)2 Q
2(1− β) (3)
where Q(x) is defined as the solution of the equation
1/
√
2pi
∫
∞
Q(x)
exp(−y2/2)dy = x and we have supposed
erec > eAB .
Here, we introduce a parameter ec and suppose H(ec) =
S(MB|E). Then from the requirement S(MB|E) > H(erec),
we know that ec > erec. In practice, ec and eAB are
determined by the quantum channel, the β is determined
by practical requirements, so Alice and Bob need to choose
proper erec and m to satisfy the Eq. (3). Set δI = H(ec) −
H(eAB), where δI denotes the secret rate per digit. Then we
have
m > eAB(1− eAB)(log2
1− eAB
eAB
)2(
1
δI
)2
×Q2(1− β) (4)
where we have used the result that erec < ec and ec− eAB ≈
δI/ log2
1−eAB
eAB
.
The value of m will determine the computational complex-
ity of the error correction. For the common error correction
code, the computational complexity is of order O(m2) [20].
In the above we have discussed the binary symmetric case.
In the practical case the channel may be asymmetric and
the BER of different bit may be different. Under such cases
whether the error can be corrected is not only determined
by the number of errors, but also determined by the BER
of each bit. There is still a threshold for such case, which is
determined by the amount of the published error correction
information, but now whether certain amount of errors can be
corrected or not becomes probabilistic [20], [21], [25]. If the
4Under the symmetric binary channel condition, the distribution of the
number of errors obey the binominal distribution: P (n) = CnmenAB(1 −
eAB)
m−n
, where n describes the number of errors.
4number of errors is larger than this threshold, all the errors
can be corrected with high probability. On the contrary, if the
number of errors is smaller than this threshold, the errors can
be corrected with comparatively low probability. The larger
the number of the errors, the smaller the probability that all
errors can be corrected is. To guarantee that possible errors
can be corrected with much high probability, Alice and Bob
should also ensure that the actual number of the errors is
smaller than this threshold with a high probability. The upper
bound of this threshold is determined by Alice’s conditional
entropy conditioned on Bob and the secret key rate. Then the
problem becomes similar to that under the binary symmetric
case. According to the large number theory, the distribution of
the number of errors can also be approximated by the Gaussian
distribution under this case. Then by the same way used for
the binary symmetric case, we can also prove that under the
case that the channel is asymmetric or the BER of different
bit is different, the minimum block size of the required error
correction code satisfies
m ∝ ( 1
δI
)2. (5)
Here we have not written Eq. (5) explicitly into terms of the
BER and Q2(1− β), because under the asymmetric case it is
difficult to give a general form to the variance of the Gaussian
approximation and actually only the relationship between m
and δI is essential for us. In the following we will discuss the
relationship between the minimum block size and the channel
transmission.
In the reconciliation given in the Ref. [12], they grouped
the bits into several strings, so that in one string different
bit corresponds to different key element. Then if Eve does the
individual attack5 or the collective attack, the bits in one string
can be uncorrelated. Also, since Eve attacks each signal by the
same method, the distribution of each key element is identical,
so that the Gaussian approximation can be used to describe the
distribution of the number of errors in one string. Therefore
under the individual attack or the collective attack case the
above model can be applied to the reconciliation given in Ref.
[12]. There may be other reconciliation method, in which the
bits in one string are totally correlated with each other, so that
the above model can not be applied. However, the efficiency of
current error correction code will be much low if the bits in one
string are correlated. Actually, under the current technology,
the computational complexity of the error correction will be
largely increased if we make the bit correlated. Therefore in
the following we only discuss the uncorrelated case.
In the above we have discussed the relationship between
the minimum block size and the secret key rate. For the
binary symmetric case, we gave the explicit expression for
the minimum block size in Eqs. (3) and (4). Since the binary
5Generally, Eve’s attack can be separated into three classes, individual
attack, collective attack and coherent attack. The individual attack means
that Eve attacks each signal system separately with the same method and
later measures her quantum state right after the sifting step. The collective
attack means that Eve attacks each signal system separately with the same
method but can do arbitrary measurement after all of the steps, including the
reconciliation, privacy amplification and the encryption. The Coherent attack
is the most general attack, where Eve can attack all of the signals together
and do the measurement at the end of the protocol.
symmetric case is the easiest condition to handle, using this
result we can give a rough estimation to the minimum block
size. We also considered the non binary symmetric case.
However, we have not given the explicit expression for the
block size under this case. Because under such case the
minimum block size depend on the concrete properties of the
channel, it is difficult for us to give a general form. At least
using Eq. (5) we can give a rough estimation for the order of
the computational complexity if some experimental results are
given.
B. Computational complexity of present schemes
In single photon schemes, after the quantum communica-
tion, almost all the information of the distributed binary string
is kept in secret from Eve, i.e., δI → 1, so the required m can
be very small. However, in CVQKD, most of the information
may be tapped by Eve, and consequently, the δI is very close
to 0, so that the required m will be very large. We can give a
rough estimation to the example given in Sec. II. We suppose
the channel is binary symmetric. At first we roughly estimate
the BER and the secret key rate per binary digit of a typical
string. Alice’s conditional entropy rate conditioned on Bob’s
variable is 3.5-bit per key element. Since Alice and Bob map
their key element into 4 digit, we estimate BER eAB of a
typical converted binary string by 4H(eAB) = 3.5. Thus
eAB ≈ 0.29. Also we suppose the secret information each
digit carries is 0.007/4=0.00175-bit6. If we set 1− β = 10−7,
then Q2(1−β) ≈ 27. Using Eq. (3), we obtain m > 107. That
means, to share common secret key with high probability and
to restrain the probability that Eve gets their key, Alice and
Bob should set the criteria of the error correction at least to
107 digits. Then, even with ideal error correction technique,
the required block size should be larger than 107. For present
LDPC coding, only under the simulation condition and with a
very simple code, can this block size be realized [20]. Because
we suppose that the channel is binary symmetric and many
other factors have not been taken into account, the estimated
result may be far away from the practical one. In the following
we will give an estimation based on current experiment.
From the Ref. [7] we know that for the RRCVQKD if there
is no excess noise and Eve is classical the secret key rate
per key element is proportional to 1/η, where η denotes the
channel transmission. Then we can safely assume that after the
conversion, the secret key information carried by single binary
bit is proportional to 1/η. Since the computational complexity
generally is proportional to the square of the block size [20],
from Eq. (5) we conclude that the minimum computational
complexity of the error correction is at least of order O(m2) ≈
O(1/δI4) ≈ O(1/η4) ≈ O[exp(0.18L)], where L denotes the
transmission distance in units of km, and the fiber attenuation
efficiency has been chosen to be 0.2dB/km. The authors of
Ref. [7], can distill the secret key within 3.1dB loss (η ≈ 0.5,
15km fiber), even though high performance error correction
was used and Eve was assumed to be classical. While under
the condition of 10dB loss (η = 0.1, 50km fiber), the required
6The secret key rate 0.007-bit per key element is obtained under the
assumption that Eve is classical.
5error correction will be at least 600 times more complex.
Under the 100km fiber case, it will be at least 6ˆ106 times
more complex7. Then, whether the secret key can be distilled
becomes doubtful. Moreover, as the error correction becomes
very complex, the practical computation speed of the algorithm
will certainly become very low. Therefore, even though the
secret key can be distilled and the physical modulation and
detection rate can be very high, the practical secret key rate,
which will be limited by computational complexity, cannot be
actually improved.
IV. REMARKS
The purpose of this letter is to show a hindrance of the secret
key distillation for the CVQKD under the high loss condition,
so in many sections we just discussed an ideal case. In the
example of Sec. II we supposed an ideal quantization that can
convert continuous-variables into symmetric and independent
bit string which is the easiest to handle. Consequently, if we
show that even under this ideal condition, the error correction
is prohibitive, then it will be much more prohibitive under
the practical case. Moreover, here we not only discussed the
error correction, but also considered the security. Although it
is widely believed (Gilbert-Varshanov conjecture) that general
decoder can only correct half the errors which can be corrected
by an ideal error correction code [25], in the security analysis
we should assume that Eve has the most powerful error correc-
tion and her ability should only be restricted by the theoretical
limit rather than the wide belief. We can see that even under
the condition that Alice can correct all the errors an ideal error
correction code can correct, the computational complexity is
still very exaggerated. If the practical error correction is the
widely believed one, the practical reconciliation will be much
more prohibitive.
It also should be noted that we supposed Eve’s attack is
individual attack or collective attack, so by the reconciliation
method given in Ref. [12] we can ensure that the bits in Alice
and Bob’s strings are uncorrelated. If we take the most pow-
erful attack, coherent attack, into account, the computational
complexity will be much more complex8. Here we were going
to show the impossibility of the secret key distillation at long
distance transmission, so we only considered the individual
and collective attack case. If the secret key cannot be distilled
under this limit condition, it certainly cannot be distilled under
the coherent attack condition.
In the examples of Sec II and III we were discussing the
pure RRCVQKD that is without any other tactic, such as
post-selection, assisted. For this pure RRCVQKD, it has been
shown that the mutual information between Alice and Bob is
certainly larger than that between Eve and Bob and thus it
is expected to provide high secret key rate. Here we showed
7This relationship is of the minimum block size. It is possible that the
efficiency of the reconciliation used in Ref. [7] is low and after some
improvement the practical computational complexity under 3.1dB loss can
be largely reduced. Therefore, this relationship does not accurately represent
the practical one.
8The individual attack and the collective attack are the subclass of the
coherent attack.
that if other tactics are not employed, the minimum compu-
tational complexity is certainly exponentially proportional to
the transmission distance.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have discussed in detail the compu-
tational complexity of the error correction required by the
CVQKD. It has been shown that if other tactics, such as post-
selection [5], is not introduced, the minimum computational
complexity of the RRCVQKD is exponentially proportional
to the transmission length. For single photon schemes, the
single photon source and detector are the main limitations to
the transmission distance and the secret key rate [24], while
for present CVQKD we have shown that the computational
complexity may be the key hurdle. Although the CVQKD
solve the problem of the light source and detection, it brings
a new problem, computational complexity. With the progress
of the computer and new error correction technique, the com-
putational complexity of the RRCVQKD may no longer be a
problem, but under existing techniques, its strict requirements
are difficult to satisfy.
Acknowledgments
Special thanks are given to Ling-An Wu, H. Pu and P.
Grangier. We also thank F. Zhang and J. Ma for the discussions
on the error correction.
REFERENCES
[1] D. Gottesman and J. Preskill, “Secure quantum key distribution using
squeezed states,” Phys. Rev. A 63, 022309 (2001).
[2] Ch. Silberhorn, N. Korolkova and G. Leuchs, “Quantum key distribution
with bright entangled beams,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 88, 167902 (2002).
[3] R. Namiki and T. Hirano, “Practical limitations for continuous-variable
quantum cryptography using coherent states,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 92,
117901 (2004).
[4] T. Hirano, H. Yamanaka, M. Ashikaga, T. Konishi and R. Namiki,
“Quantum cryptography using pulsed homodyne detection,” Phys. Rev.
A 68, 042331 (2003).
[5] Ch. Silberhorn, T. C. Ralph, N. Lu¨tkenhaus and G. Leuchs, “Continuous
variable quantum cryptography: beating the 3dB loss limit, Phys,” Phys.
Rev. Lett. 89, 167901 (2002).
[6] C. Weedbrook, A. M. Lance, W. P. Bowen, T. Symul, T. C. Ralph and
P. K. Lam, “Quantum cryptography without switching,” Phys. Rev. Lett.
93, 170504 (2004).
[7] F. Grosshans, G. Van Assche, J. Wenger, R. Brourl, N. J. Cerf and P.
Grangier, “Quantum key distribution using Gaussian-modulated coherent
states,” Nature 421, 238 (2003).
[8] A. M. Lance, T. Symul, V. Sharma, C. Weedbrook, T. C. Ralph and
P. K. Lam, “No-Switching Quantum Key Distribution Using Broadband
Modulated Coherent Light,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 180503 (2005).
[9] M. Legre, H. Zbinden and N. Gisin, “Implementation of continuous
variable quantum cryptography in optical fibers using a go-&-return
configuration,” arXiv: quant-ph/0511113, (2005).
[10] J. Lodewyck, T. Debuisschert, R. Tualle-Brouri and P. Grangier, “Con-
trolling excess noise in fiber-optics continuous-variable quantum key
distribution,” Phys. Rev. A 72, 050303 (2005).
[11] F. Grosshans and P. Grangier, “Reverse reconciliation protocols for quan-
tum cryptography with continuous variables,” arXiv: quant-ph/0204127,
(2002).
[12] G. Van Assche, J. Cardinal and N. J. Cerf, “Reconciliation of a quantum-
distributed Gaussian key,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 50, 394 (2004).
[13] M. Heid and N. Lu¨kenhaus, “Efficiency of coherent state quantum cryp-
tography in the presence of loss: Influence of realistic error correction
”, Phys. Rev. A 73, 052316 (2006).
[14] C. E. Shannon, “Certain results in coding theory for noisy channels”
Information and Control, 1, pp. 6 (1957).
6[15] C. E. Shannon, “A mathematical theory of communication,” Bell Syst.
Tech. J. 27, 379 (1948).
[16] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, C. Crepeau and U. M. Maurer, “Generalized
privacy amplification,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 41, 1915 (1995).
[17] U. M. Maurer and S. Wolf, “Secret-key agreement over unauthenticated
public channels—Part III: Privacy amplification,” IEEE Trans. Inform.
Theory, vol. 49, pp. 839–851, Apr. 2003.
[18] U. M. Maurer and S. Wolf, “Secret-key agreement over unauthenticated
public channels—Part I: Definitions and a Completeness Result,” IEEE
Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 49, pp. 822–831, Apr. 2003.
[19] U. M. Maurer, “Secret key agreement by public discussion from common
information,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 39, pp. 733–742, May
1993.
[20] S. Y. Chung, G. D. Forney, T. J. Richardson and R. Urbanke, “On
the design of low-density parity-check codes within 0.0045dB of the
Shannon limit,” IEEE Communications Letters 5(2), 58 (2001).
[21] C. Berrou, A Glavieux and P. Thitimajshima, “Near Shannon limit error-
correcting coding and decoding,” Proc. ICC’93, Geneva, Switzerland,
May 1993, pp. 1064 (1993).
[22] C. Elliott, A. Colvin, D. Pearson, O. Pikalo, J. Schlafer and H.
Yeh, “Current status of the DARPA Quantum Network,” arXiv:
quant-ph/0503058 (2005).
[23] D. Pearson, “High-speed QKD Reconciliation using Forward Error
Correction,” Proc. 7th International conference on Quantum Commu-
nication, Measurement and Computing (QCMC), pp. 299 (2004)
[24] X. F. Mo, B. Zhu, Z. F. Han, Y. Z. Gui and G. C. Guo, “Faraday-
Michelson system for quantum cryptography,” Opt. Lett. 30, 2632
(2005).
[25] David J.C. MacKay, “Information Theory, Inference, and Learning
Algorithm”, Cambridge University Press, p212.
